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Abstract 
Elections and voting are fundamental to any consensus-based society. They are one of the 
most critical functions of democracy. There are a number of voting systems adopted all 
over the world with each of them having its peculiar problems. The manual voting system 
still appears prominent among the developed and developing nations, but with 
considerations being given to an electronic alternative with a view to showing most of the 
short comings. Furthermore, with the increased interest and attention on e-government, 
e-democracy and e-governance, e-voting initiatives have gained more significance. Thus, 
many countries are piloting with various e-voting models and systems in order to enable 
voting from anywhere; also, international organisations are developing standards and 
recommendations in this area. This paper details a review of the underlying concepts of 
e-voting and discusses some of the salient issues on the subject. Also, a review of 
common e-voting models, existing elections schemes and explanation of the usual 
terminologies associated with e-voting were presented. 
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1. Introduction 
Electronic voting has been attracting considerable attention during the last years. The 
interest in e-voting is based on one hand upon interest and attention devoted to 
e-government, e-democracy, e-governance, etc. On the other hand, interest in e-voting is 
founded in problems with conventional election systems. The term e-voting is being used 
from casting the vote by electronic means to asking the internet community for an 
opinion on a political issue, as well as from tabulating the votes by electronic means to 
integrated electronic systems from voters’ and candidates’ registration to the publication 
of election results (Buchsbaum, 2004). Other terms, like e.g. e-elections and i-voting have 
been introduced in order to clarify the specific contents of e-voting. The term e-voting 
should encompass only political elections and referenda, not initiatives or opinion polls or 
selective citizens’ participation between elections or referenda (e-consultations) 
(Buchsbaum, 2004). 
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In general, two main types of e-voting can be identified: e-voting supervised by the 
physical presence of representatives of governmental or independent electoral authorities, 
e.g. electronic voting machines at poll sites popularly known as Direct Recording 
Electronics (DRE); and e-voting within the voter’s sole influence (remote e-voting), not 
physically supervised by representatives of governmental authorities, e.g. voting from 
one’s own or another person’s computer via the internet, by mobile phones (including 
Short Message Service, SMS), or via digital television (Okediran et al., 2011). By this 
summary categorisation, advance voting of some Nordic countries at postal offices, or 
kiosk voting at municipal offices can fall, according to specific circumstances, in both of 
the above cases. 
Exhaustive studies have shown that electronic voting, if carefully designed, enhances 
polling and votes’ security, confidentiality, sincerity and increased cost savings on 
reduced manpower, logistical materials and tools; and above all instant analysis and 
reporting. Electronic voting further enhances accuracy of all valid votes and final 
outcome; permit voting once for only eligible voters; allow independent verification of all 
voters; it can also improve voters’ turnaround as it flexibly allows a voter to login and 
vote from any workstation (Alan, 2005). Therefore, electronic based voting technologies 
would expand the reach and range of potential voting population. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; the next section describes the motivation 
and criteria for electronic voting. Section three presents an apt description of e-voting 
process while section four discussed some generic cryptographic models for secure 
electronic voting as proposed by academic literature. Finally, the paper concludes in 
section five.  
 
2. Motivation and Criteria for Electronic Voting 
The right of individuals to vote for their choice representatives is the heart of any 
democracy. Democracy and elections have more than 2500 years of tradition (Krimmer et 
al., 2007). However, technology has always influenced and shaped the ways elections are 
held (Held, 2006). In times past, different voting systems that are based on traditional 
paper ballots, mechanical devices, or electronic ballots were developed for elections (NSF, 
2001) and (Malkawi et al., 2009). However, these voting systems have littered history 
with example of elections being manipulated in order to influence their outcome. 
Allegations of violence, intimidation, ballot stuffing, under-age and multiple voting, 
counting error, complicity of the security agencies and the absence or late arrival of 
election materials etc often trail elections conducted using these systems of voting (NSF, 
2001; Muir et al., 2005; Boniface, 2008; Malkawi et al., 2009; Okediran et.al, 2011). 
E-voting is emerging is significant alternative to these conventional systems. The 
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emergence of e-voting will undoubtedly enable voters to cast their vote from a place other 
than the poll site in their voting district, facilitate the casting of the vote by the voter, 
facilitate the participation in elections by those who are entitled to vote, widen access to 
the voting process for voters with disabilities or those having other difficulties in being 
physically present at a poll site, increased voter turnout by providing additional voting 
channels, reduce over time, the overall cost to the electoral authorities of conducting an 
election, deliver voting results reliably and more quickly amongst many other benefits 
(Okediran et al.,2011). 
CoE (2003) recommended that e-voting systems should guarantee the following major 
principles of democratic elections: 





In addition to the aforementioned principles above, (Cranor and Cytron, 1996) and (Lebre 
et al., 2004) proposed that any electronic voting system should have four core properties 
that include accuracy, democracy, privacy and verifiability. These four core properties are 
defined as follows (Cranor and Cytron, 1996): 
i. Accuracy: A system is accurate if 
a) It is not possible for a vote to be altered, 
b) It is not possible for a validated vote to be eliminated from the final tally, 
and 
c) It is not possible for an invalid vote to be counted in the final tally. 
In the most accurate systems the final vote tally must be perfect, either because no 
inaccuracies can be introduced or because all inaccuracies introduced can be detected and 
corrected. Partially accurate systems can detect but not necessarily correct inaccuracies. 
Accuracy can be measured in terms of the margin of error, the probability of error, or the 
number of points at which error can be introduced (Cranor and Cytron, 1996). 
ii. Democracy: Democracy: A system is democratic if 
a) It permits only eligible voters to vote, 
b) It ensures that each eligible voter can vote only once (Cranor and Cytron, 
1996). 
iii. Privacy: A system is private if 
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a) Neither election authorities nor anyone else can link any ballot to the voter 
who cast it, and 
b) No voter can prove that he or she voted in a particular way. 
The second privacy factor is important for the prevention of vote buying and extortion. 
Voters can only sell their votes if they are able to prove to the buyer that they actually 
voted according to the buyer’s wishes. Likewise, those who use extortion to force voters 
to vote in a particular way cannot succeed unless they can demand that voters prove that 
they voted as requested (Cranor and Cytron, 1996). 
iv. Verifiability: A system is verifiable if voters can independently verify that their 
votes have been counted correctly. 
The most verifiable systems allow all voters to verify their votes and correct any mistakes 
they might and without sacrificing privacy. Less verifiable systems might allow mistakes 
to be pointed out, but not corrected or might allow verification of the process by party 
representatives but not by individual voters (Cranor and Cytron, 1996). 
3. Description of the E-voting process 
In most election processes, the voting system is always a relatively small part of the 
whole election process. Generally, an e-voting system consists of six main phases which 
includes 
(Magi, 2007): 
• Voters’ registration is a phase to define voters for the e-voting system and give 
them authentication data to log into the e-voting system. 
• The authentication is a phase to verify that the voters have access rights and 
franchise. 
• The voting and vote’s saving is a phase where eligible voters cast votes and 
e-voting system saves the received votes from voters. 
• The votes’ managing is a phase in which votes are managed, sorted and prepared 
for counting. 
• The votes’ counting is the phase to decrypt and count the votes and to output the 
final tally. 
• The auditing is a phase to check that eligible voters were capable to vote and their 
votes participate in the computation of final tally. 
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From another perspective, Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information 
Standards (OASIS) described a conceptual perspective of e-voting to be made of three 
phases namely pre-voting phase, voting phase and post-voting phase. They specified what 
they called an Election Markup Language (EML) which was designed especially for the 
exchange of data within e-voting processes. OASIS drafted a high level overview and a 
high level model dealing with the human view and a high level model dealing with the 
technical view. These models should be the initial point of creating e-voting concepts. 
EML is in particular useful for interoperability reasons (Oasis, 2003). 
The activities of the pre-voting phase are (Oasis, 2003): 
i. Candidate Nomination Process 
a) Candidate Nomination 
b) Candidate Response 
c) Generation of the Candidates List 
ii. Voter Registration Process 
a) Voter Registration 
b) Generation of the Election List 
 
Figure 1 depicts the Human Model stated by the Election Markup Language. 
The voting phase enables all eligible voters to make their decisions and cast their votes. 
Thus, by the use of the election list the voter has to authenticate himself/herself as an 
eligible voter and he/she has to cast his/her individual vote. The model in the figure above 
does not limit voting on electronic voting only. It is the voters’ decision which channel 
they preferred to cast their ballot. Since the voter should have an alternative to e-voting 
and since conventional voting with paper ballots must be provided in parallel, the model 
has to consider multiple possibilities. Especially the interfaces and cutting edges between 
electronic and conventional elections have to be considered in the conceptional design. 
The post-voting phase concerns mainly: 
i. Vote counting and 
ii. Result reporting  
Beside the phases mentioned above, there are some other important parts and elements in 
the model. Very important are the audit mechanisms needed along all phases of an 
election. On the one hand, it is important to have possibilities to prove the correctness of 
the process as such. On the other hand, it is crucial to do not violate the main principles 
and security requirements, keeping a vote an inviolable secret in particular. However, 
audit is necessary to prove the authenticity of the result of the election. Thus, a special set 
of persons, e.g. election officials and candidate’s representatives, should be allowed to 
gain access to auditing information. 
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System administration is critical as well, since administrators are allowed to access the 
system. Nevertheless, administration is necessary and therefore the security concept of 
the e-voting system has to protect critical data and components, the secrecy of the ballots 
especially. This affects the organizational aspects of the security concept either. Not only 
technical security mechanisms can guarantee this. The administrative staff has to be 
elected in respect to reliability as well. 
 
4. Generic Cryptographic Models for Secure Electronic Voting 
Since the first cryptographic protocols for electronic elections was published (Chaum, 
1981), (Demillo et al., 1982; Benaloh, 1987), several solutions have been described in 
academia to deal with the security problems in online voting. In this section we review 
three generic models proposed in academic literature for secure e-voting. 
4.1 The Mix-net Model 
Mix networks (mix-nets), introduced in (Chaum,1981), usually consist of a set of servers 
(mixes) which accept a batch of input messages and output the batch in randomly 
permuted (mixed) order so that the input and output messages are unlinkable. Figure 2 
depicts then general case of voting with mix-net model. Although originally proposed for 
anonymous e-mail communication between distrusting entities, mix-nets in online 
elections aim at hiding the origin of a ballot: tallying officials permute and randomize the 
encrypted ballots so that the link between the identity of the voter and the vote is broken. 
Depending on the mixing mechanism, mix-nets can be classified into re-encryption 
mix-nets and decryption mix-nets. 
 
 
4.2 The Homomorphic Model 
According to this model, introduced in (Cramer et al., 1997) and extended in (Baudron et 
al., 2001), each voter signs and publishes an encryption of his/her vote. Encrypted votes 
are then “added” into the final tally, to form an encryption of the “sum” of the submitted 
votes. The model is based on the algebraic homomorphic properties of several 
probabilistic public key cryptosystems. These cryptosystems encrypt a message M by 
raising a base g to the power M modulo a large prime number, and then randomizing the 
result. With homomorphic encryption there is an operation ⊕ defined on the message 
space and an operation ⊗ defined on the cipher space, such that the “product” of the 
encryptions of any two votes is the encryption of the “sum” of the votes, i.e.: 
EM1   ⊕   EM2 = E (M1 ⊗ M2)           
(1) 
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This property allows either to tally votes as aggregates or to combine shares of votes 
(Benaloh, 1987; Schoenmakers, 1999), without decrypting single votes. However, each 
vote must belong to a well-determined set of possible votes such as {+1, -1} for {“yes”, 
“no”} votes. Moreover, each voter must provide a universally verifiable proof that his/her 
vote belongs to the predefined set of votes, otherwise, it would be easy for a malicious 
voter to manipulate the final tally. 
After the voting period has closed, a threshold of election authorities cooperatively 
decrypts the final tally. The results are published on a bulletin board and the accuracy of 
the voting stage is verified. Depending on the level of trust given to them, the authorities 
may also provide a publicly verifiable proof that the decryption was correct. In this way 
individual voters and/or external observers can be assured that all the votes were counted 
correctly. An example of the homomorphic voting model is shown in Figure 3. 
While the original model provides a general framework that allows usage of any 
probabilistic encryption scheme, only few probabilistic encryption schemes can scale 
well in large elections with multiple candidates. For example, in (Cramer et al., 1997) a 
variant of the ElGamal encryption scheme required an exhaustive search over all possible 
election results by the authorities for the computation of the final tally. Recent proposals 
have been based on additively homomorphic public key cryptosystems with trapdoor 
decryption of discrete logarithms (Paillier, 1999; Baudron et al., 2001; Damgard et al., 
2003), in order to allow handling of very large tallies. 
The homomorphic model satisfies the accuracy, privacy, fairness, robustness and 
universal verifiability properties. It also inherently supports prevention of double voting, 
since the voters do not need to be anonymous. It works well in elections where ballots 
have only questions of a K-out-of-L type, which precludes write-in ballots. Another 
unattractive feature is that voters may need to run special-purpose code on their computer, 
for constructing the zero-knowledge proof of validity for their vote. 
4.3 The Blind Signature Model 
Election protocols of this category, introduced in (Fujioka et al., 1992), enable voters to 
get their vote validated from an election authority, while preserving the secrecy of their 
vote. Blind signatures (Chaum, 1982) are the electronic equivalent of signing 
carbon-paper-lined envelopes: a user seals a slip of a paper inside such an envelope, and 
later gets it signed on the outside. When the envelope is opened, the slip will bear the 
carbon image of the signature. When used in an online voting protocol, a voter encrypts, 
then blinds the vote, and presents it to a validating authority for validation. After the 
authority validates the vote, the voter un-blinds the encrypted vote and gets a validated 
vote that cannot longer be correlated to the original blinded message. The voter then uses 
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an anonymous channel to submit the validated vote to the tallying authorities, as shown in 
Figure 4. 
Protocols within this model are simple, easily manageable, computationally efficient and 
naturally support “write-in” ballots. A problem with early schemes (Fujioka et al., 1992; 
Cranor and Cytron, 1996; Herschberg, 1997) was the ability of a malicious server to 
impersonate absentee voters in the final tally, thus violating the democracy criterion. In 
the original model (Fujioka et al., 1992) two-phase voting was supported to achieve 
fairness: voters submitted their encrypted vote and then waited until the end of the 
election to submit their vote-opening keys. In (Cranor and Cytron, 1997) and (Herschberg, 
1997) the protocol of (Fujioka et al., 1992) was changed to allow voters to vote and walk 
away, however in both protocols there is the risk that a malicious authority learns 
intermediate results, therefore violating the fairness property. In subsequent proposals 
(Ohkubo et al., 1999; Durette, 1999; Joaquim et al.,2003; Lebre et al., 2004) the power of 
administration is distributed among multiple authorities so that: 
i. no election administrator is able to impersonate legitimate voters in the final tally, 
and  
ii. the results are becoming available only at the end of the election.  
To establish robustness in the election process, threshold techniques were also proposed 
(Ohkubo et al.,1999; Joaquim et al., 2003; Lebre et al.,2004). For example, in (Ohkubo et 
al., 1999), a (t, N) threshold cryptosystem assured that as long as N-t+1 counters are 
honest, the results will only be available at the end of the election.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we gave a short introduction of e-voting system and e-voting systems. We 
presented the basic requirements and the important assets of electronic elections. A 
description of the e-voting process was presented and in this course, the Election Markup 
Language (EML) and the human model given within their definition were presented. We 
discussed the three main cryptographic schemes for secure electronic voting. These are 
homomorphic encryption, mixing nets and blind signatures. We provided an explicit 
description of the core ideas behind these schemes. It is worthy to note that most of the 
other existing schemes make use of these schemes or a combination of them. 
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Figure 2: The General Case of Voting with mix-net 
 










Figure 4: Blind Signature Model (Fujioka et al., 1992) 
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